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FOOTLOOSE AND FANCY FREE? STATE AID AFTER BREXIT 
 
Stephanie Switzer* 
 
There is a perception in certain quarters that EU state aid law acts as a barrier to the h< ?Ɛ
ability to pursue an effective industrial policy. Indeed, while the level of state aid provided 
by the UK is low,
1
 members of the current UK government and >ĂďŽƵƌ ?Ɛ:ĞƌĞŵǇŽƌďǇŶhave 
framed the EU state aid regime as potentially limiting the h< ?Ɛ ĂďŝůŝƚǇ ƚŽ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ƌŝƚŝƐŚ
business.
2
 dŚĞh< ?ƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƚŽůĞĂǀĞƚŚĞhŚĂƐƚŚƵƐůĞĚƐŽŵĞĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĂƚŽƌƐƚŽŽƉŝŶĞƚŚĂƚ
Brexit will allow the UK to provide greater support to domestic industry.
3
   
 
This article evaluates to what extent, if any, Brexit could provide the UK with greater 
autonomy to grant state aid. Section A provides a brief overview of the current EU state aid 
regime. Section B examines possible UK state aid arrangements after Brexit. Section C 
discusses state aid in the context of a no-ĚĞĂů ‘ŚĂƌĚ ? Brexit and compares the state aid law 
of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) with that of the EU. Section D evaluates the extent 
to which ƚŚĞůĂǁŽĨƚŚĞtdKǁŽƵůĚĂĐƚĂƐĂďĂƌƌŝĞƌƚŽƚŚĞh< ?ƐĂďŝů ƚǇƚŽŐƌĂŶƚƐƵďƐŝĚŝĞƐƚŽ
its domestic industry. Section E concludes.   
 
A. THE EU STATE AID REGIME  
The EU state aid regime is established in Articles 107  W 108 TFEU.4 Pursuant to Article 107 
(1) TFEU, state aid is the grant of governmental assistance which,  ‘distorts or threatens to 
distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or in the production of certain goods. ? 
TŚĞŐƌĂŶƚŽĨƐƵĐŚĂŝĚ ? ‘ŝŶƐŽĨĂƌ as it ĂĨĨĞĐƚƐƚƌĂĚĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶDĞŵďĞƌ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ? ?ŝƐŝŶĐŽŵƉĂƚŝďle 
with the internal market and hence prohibited.   
While the EU state aid regime would appear to prohibit all types of state aid, it 
contains a number of exceptions. Under Article 107(2) TFEU, for example, certain types of 
state aid are deemed to be compatible with the internal market. These include, inter alia, 
assistance having a social character, granted to individual consumers as well as aid aimed at 
remediating damage caused by natural disasters. Furthermore, under Article 107(3), the 
Commission has discretion to determine that other categories of state aid are compatible 
                                                     
* Lecturer in Law, University of Strathclyde. My thanks go to Aileen McHarg and Barry 
Rodger for their helpful comments. The usual disclaimer applies.  
1
 ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ ŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?  “h ^ƚĂƚĞ ŝĚ ^ĐŽƌĞďŽĂƌĚ  ? ? ? ? ?  ?  ? ? ? ? available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/scoreboard/technical_note_en.pdf. 
2
 For a useful overview of these discussions, see A ŝŽŶĚŝ ? “The First on the Flight Home: The 
Sad Story of StatĞŝĚŽŶƚƌŽůŝŶƚŚĞƌĞǆŝƚŐĞ ? (2016) 27 (2) Kings LJ 442 at 442  W 443. 
3
 See, eg ?^tĞůƚŽŶ ? “&ƌĞĞĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞh ?ƐƐŚĂĐŬůĞƐ ?ƌĞǆŝƚƌŝƚĂŝŶĐĂŶƌĞŬŝŶĚůĞƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŽŶƐ ?
(10 April 2017) available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/04/10/freed-eus-
shackles-brexit-britain-can-rekindle-regions/. 
4
 For an overview, see K Bacon, European Union Law of State Aid, 3
rd
 edn (2017).  
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with the internal market.
5
 There are also a number of block exemptions, including a General 
Block Exemption Regulation.
6
  
 
 The Commission exercises surveillance and supervisory control over state aid and 
States must notify it of any plans to implement new or alter existing state aid.
7
 The grant of 
state aid without prior approval is unlawful.
8
 Aid falling under a block exemption does not, 
however, require notification. Most, though by no means all, state aid is now covered by the 
General Block Exemption Regulation and does not require prior approval.
9
 Certain other 
types of aid falling below a de minimis level are also exempt from notification.
10
  
 
 The EU state aid regime has been extensively criticised. According to Peretz and 
Bacon, these criticisms largely fall into three categories: that the Commission has taken an 
unduly expansive view of what constitutes state aid; that Commission ?Ɛ decisions at times 
lack transparency and economic rigour; and that the approval process for notified state aid 
is far from timely.
11
 Such concerns were also expressed ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ 'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ
balance of competences review.
12
 
  
 
B. STATE AID AFTER BREXIT   
 
In the short term, the UK is expected to reproduce EU state aid rules as retained EU law. 
This is certainly the approach envisaged in the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill.
13
 In the 
longer term, the shape of state aid disciplines in the UK will depend, at least in part, upon 
the nature of post-Brexit settlement between the UK and the EU-27. The European Council 
has underscored ƚŚĂƚĂŶǇĚĞĂůǁŝƚŚƚŚĞh<ƐŚŽƵůĚĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĂ ‘ůĞǀĞůƉůĂǇŝŶŐĨŝĞůĚ ?ŝŶƚŚĞĂƌĞĂ
of state aid and competition law.
14
 This concern is apt to result in the EU insisting that state 
aid provisions are inserted into any agreement with the UK.
15
   
                                                     
5
 Under Article 107 (3) (e) TFEU and Article 108 (2), third paragraph TFEU, the Council may 
extend the categories of aid which may be compatible with the internal market.  
6
 Council Regulation 651/2014 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the 
internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty (GBER) OJ 2014 L187/1. 
7
 Article 108 (3) TFEU. 
8
 For a discussion of the procedures applicable to the investigation of such aid, see Bacon (n 
4) ch 18.  
9
 Bacon (n 4) 153. Note, however, that a summary of the measure must still be forwarded to 
the Commission; GBER (n 6) para 5.18.  
10
 Regulation (EU) 1407/2013 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid OJ 2013 L352/1.  
11
 'WĞƌĞƚǌĂŶĚ<ĂĐŽŶ ? “WĂƉĞƌŽŶƉŽƐƚ-ƌĞǆŝƚŽƉƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌ^ƚĂƚĞĂŝĚ ? ? ? ?EŽǀĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ?
available at http://uksala.org/paper-on-post-brexit-options-for-state-aid/ 
12
 Ibid.   
13
 European Union (Withdrawal) Bill 2017, Clauses 3 and 4. See also the Explanatory Notes 
to the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, paras 87 and 89. 
14
 European Council (Art. 50) guidelines following the United Kingdom's notification under 
Article 50 TEU (2017) §20. 
15
 Biondi (n 2) 450.  
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In reviewing the range of potential deals between the UK and the EU-27, it appears 
unlikely the UK will pursue a deal with the EU based on membership of the European 
Economic Area (EEA). This would have largely retained the status quo for state aid within 
the UK albeit with key differences such as the EFTA Surveillance Authority performing the 
role of the Commission. Other potential models for a deal are possible and, indeed, have 
been discussed extensively in the literature.
16
 However, the ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů ĨŽƌĂ ŶŽĚĞĂů  ‘ŚĂƌĚ ? 
Brexit remains very real.  
 
In the event of no deal,
17
 the UK will continue to be bound by the rules of the WTO on 
subsidies. This is because the UK is a Member of the WTO and will remain so after Brexit. By 
dint of this, the UK is a party to the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
DĞĂƐƵƌĞƐ  ?^D ? ? ƚŚĞ ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞ ŽĨ ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝƐ ƚŽ  ‘ŝŵƉŽƐĞŵƵůƚŝůĂƚĞƌĂů ĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĞƐ ŽŶ ƐƵďƐŝĚŝĞƐ
which distort internationaů ƚƌĂĚĞ ? ?18 Accordingly, even under a no deal scenario, the h< ?Ɛ 
autonomy in the area of state aid/subsidies post-Brexit will be subject to at least some 
constraint. The next section elucidates upon the key elements of the WTO SCM.  
 
C. INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND STATE AID 
 
The WTO SCM is designed ƚŽĞŶƐƵƌĞƚŚĂƚ ? ‘ĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƐĐĞŶƚƌĞĚŽŶƚŚĞƌĞŵŽǀĂůŽĨďŽƌĚĞƌ
ďĂƌƌŝĞƌƐĂƌĞŶŽƚĐŝƌĐƵŵǀĞŶƚĞĚ ? ?19 WTO law uses the language of subsidies rather than state 
aid. A subsidy under WTO law is defined as a financial contribution by the government or a 
public body.
20
 The financial contribution in question must confer a benefit;
21
 that is, it must 
ŵĂŬĞƚŚĞƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ‘ďĞƚƚĞƌŽĨĨ ?ƚŚĂŶŝƚǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶǁŝƚŚŽƵƚƚŚĞƐƵďƐŝĚǇ ?22 Furthermore, 
ŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽŵĞĞƚƚŚĞĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶƵŶĚĞƌtdKůĂǁ ?ƚŚĞƐƵďƐŝĚǇŝŶƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŵƵƐƚďĞ ‘ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐ ? ?
This requires that it is targeted towards certain enterprises, industries or geographical 
areas.
23
  
With two exceptions relating to subsidies contingent upon export and import 
substitution policies,
24
 WTO law does not prohibit subsidies. Instead, other subsidies as 
defined under WTO law are considered  ‘ĂĐƚŝŽŶĂďůĞ ? ĂŶĚmay be challenged in the event 
                                                     
16
 See, for example, N ƌĂĨƚƐ ?  “ƌĞǆŝƚ ĂŶĚ^ƚĂƚĞŝĚ ? (2017) 33 (1) Oxford Rev of Econ Pol 
105. See also Peretz & Bacon (n 11). 
17
 Or indeed a deal which is modelled on the EU  W Canada, Comprehensive Economic and 
Trade Agreement (CETA). This contains provisions on subsidies reflective of WTO law.  
18
 WTO Panel Report, Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft (1999) WT/DS46/R, 
para 7.26. 
19
 > ZƵďŝŶŝ ?  “WTO Subsidy Laws: The InternĂƚŝŽŶĂů ZĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ^ƚĂƚĞ ŝĚ ?, in H C H 
Hofmann and C Micheau (eds), State Aid and the European Union (2016) 469 at 472. 
20
 SCM, art 1.1.  
21
 Ibid. 
22
 WTO Appellate Body Report, Canada - Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft 
(1999), WT/DS70/AB/R, para 157. 
23
 See SCM, art 2. 
24
 SCM, art 3. Prohibited subsidies are automatically considered specific; SCM, art 2.3.  
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ƚŚĞǇĐĂƵƐĞ ‘ĂĚǀĞƌƐĞĞĨĨĞĐƚƐ ?25 to the interests of another Member.26 Adverse effects include, 
inter alia, injury to the domestic industry of another Member.
27
  
Actionable subsidies causing adverse effects may be challenged multilaterally before 
the WTO dispute settlement system.
28
 If a subsidy,  ‘ƌĞƐƵůƚƐin adverse ĞĨĨĞĐƚƐ ?ƚŚĞDĞŵďĞƌ
granting or maintaining such subsidy shall take appropriate steps to remove the adverse 
ĞĨĨĞĐƚƐŽƌƐŚĂůůǁŝƚŚĚƌĂǁƚŚĞƐƵďƐŝĚǇ ? ?29 Prohibited export and import substitution subsidies 
may also be challenged multilaterally. A successful challenge will result in a direction to 
remove the subsidy ? ‘ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚĚĞůĂǇ ? ?30 
Prohibited and actionable subsidies may also be dealt with unilaterally by the affected 
Member ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞŝŵƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ĐŽƵŶƚĞƌǀĂŝůŝŶŐĚƵƚŝĞƐ ? ?ĐŽƵŶƚĞƌǀĂŝůŝŶŐĚƵƚǇŝƐĂ ‘ƐƉĞĐŝĂů 
ĚƵƚǇ ůĞǀŝĞĚĨŽƌƚŚĞƉƵƌƉŽƐĞŽĨŽĨĨƐĞƚƚŝŶŐ ?ƚŚĞƐƵďƐŝĚǇ ?31 The SCM also sets out notification 
and transparency obligations owed by Members.  
D. E>z^/^K& ?d,tdKKWd/KE ? 
As an existing WTO Member, the UK is currently required to abide by the SCM.
32
 Post-Brexit, 
and in the event that it is no longer under the state aid supervisory infrastructure of the EU, 
the UK may want to introduce an oversight system to ensure compliance with its WTO 
subsidies obligations.
33
 Such a system will invariably raise sensitive issues pertaining to 
devolution because the devolved administrations have extensive spending powers 
independent of the UK government.
34
 Under the WTO legal regime, the UK is responsible for 
any acts of the devolved administrations in breach of the SCM. The case for a UK level 
system of control also connects to the desire to avoid subsidy races between different parts 
of the UK.
35
   
Devolution issues aside, how much scope would there be to do things differently 
should the UK no longer have to abide by EU or EEA state aid rules? To what extent would 
WTO ůĂǁĂĐƚĂƐĂďĂƌƌŝĞƌƚŽƚŚĞh< ?ƐĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽŐƌĂŶƚƐƵďƐidies to its domestic industry and 
how does it compare with the EU regime? 
                                                     
25
SCM, art 5 (a) to (c) outlines the types of adverse effects covered by the Agreement.  
26
 A third category of subsidy, non-actionable subsidies, is set out in SCM, art 8. This 
provision was allowed to expire in 2000.  
27
 SCM, art 5 on  ‘adverse effects ?. See also SCM, art 6 on serious prejudice.  
28
 SCM art 7. 
29
 SCM, art 7.8.  
30
 SCM, art 4.7. 
31
 See GATT, art VI. 
32
 /ŶĚĞĞĚ ?ŵŽƌĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇ ?  ‘ďŽƚŚĂŝĚŐƌĂŶƚĞĚďǇDĞŵďĞƌ^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚĂŝĚŐƌĂŶƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞh
itself may be considered a subsidy, and objected (to), under the SCM. This has already 
ŚĂƉƉĞŶĞĚŽŶƐĞǀĞƌĂůŽĐĐĂƐŝŽŶƐ ? ?ƐĞĞRubini (n 19) 507. 
33
 Crafts (n 16) 107.  
34
  Peretz & Bacon (n 11). 
35
 Ibid.  
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There is considerable commonality between the concept of a subsidy under WTO 
law and that of state aid under Article 107(1) TFEU.
36
 In respect of both EU and WTO law, 
ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ƐŽŵĞƐŽƌƚŽĨ ‘ďĞŶĞĨŝƚ ? ?ƚŽƵƐĞƚŚĞtdKƉĂƌůĂŶĐĞ ?Žƌ ‘ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞ ? ?to 
use the language of the EU state aid regime) is required.
37
 Furthermore, both require some 
sort of governmental measuƌĞ ?ĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůůǇ ? ƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ  ‘ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐŝƚǇ ?ƵŶĚĞƌ tdK ůĂǁ ŝƐ
ďƌŽĂĚůǇĂŶĂůŽŐŽƵƐƚŽƚŚĂƚŽĨ ‘ƐĞůĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ?ƵŶĚĞƌEU state aid law.38  
There are, however, important distinctions between EU and WTO law. There is no 
distinction in EU law between actionable and prohibited subsidies. There is also no 
requirement, or indeed scope under WTO law, for prior approval of subsidies. Review of 
subsidies under WTO law is ex post and reliant on upon another WTO Member bringing 
enforcement action, whether unilaterally through the imposition of countervailing measures 
or multilaterally through the WTO dispute settlement system. More broadly, the WTO 
system is less interventionist in that it sets a higher bar than the EU to the finding of an 
(actionable) ƐƵďƐŝĚǇ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƚĂǆŝŶŐ ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? ŝƚ ŚĂƐ ŝŶ ƉůĂĐĞ ŝŶ ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚ ŽĨ ? ĨŽƌ
ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ? ‘ĂĚǀĞƌƐĞĞĨĨĞĐƚƐ ? ?39  
The less interventionist nature of the WTO subsidies regime has led some commentators 
to claim ƚŚĞƌĞ ŵĂǇ ďĞ  ‘ŐƌĞĂƚĞƌ ƐĐŽƉĞ ĨŽƌ ƐĞůĞĐƚŝǀĞ ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂůƉŽůŝĐǇ ƵŶĚĞƌ tdK ƌƵůĞƐ ? ?40 
Indeed, Crafts argues that the UK government may consider such interventions necessary to 
address any ĚĞĐƌĞĂƐĞ ŝŶ ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶ ĚŝƌĞĐƚ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚ ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ h< ?Ɛ Ğǆŝƚ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚe single 
market.
41
 Previous UK administrations have not, however, performed particularly well when 
 ‘ƉŝĐŬŝŶŐ ǁŝŶŶĞƌƐ ? ŝŶindustrial policy and there is a high risk of capture and government 
failure in this regard.
42
 Accordingly, pure self-interest is likely to dictate that the UK will 
implement a rigorous system of independent review of the grant of state aid/subsidies.
43
 
Moreover, while the enforcement system under the WTO SCM regime is undoubtedly laxer 
than that applicable to state aid under the EU, the plethora of subsidies disputes
44
 which 
have been litigated at the WTO make it clear that the UK will not have free rein to subsidise 
domestic industry in the aftermath of Brexit.  
                                                     
36
  hŶƚĞƌŚĂůƚĞƌ ĂŶĚ d ^ĞďĂƐƚŝĂŶ ?  “After Brexit: SƚĂƚĞ ŝĚ ƵŶĚĞƌ tdK ŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĞƐ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ?
available at http://1exagu1grkmq3k572418odoooym-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/09/AFTER-BREXIT.pdf.  
37
 Rubini (n 19) 475. See also Ibid.  
38
 For discussion, see Rubini (n 19) 487. See also Unterhalter & Sebastian (n 36).  
39
 see Rubini (n 19) 506. See also Unterhalter & Sebastian (n 36). 
40
 For discussion, see Crafts (n 16) 107. 
41
 Ibid at 109. 
42
 Ibid at 111.  
43
 D^ĐŚŽŶďĞƌŐ ? “Continuity or change? State aid control in a post-Brexit United Kingdom ? 
(2017) 16 (1) Competition Law 47 at 55. The Competition and Markets Authority has been 
proposed for this task; G Peretz, K Bacon and /dĂǇůŽƌ ? “ƌŝŶŐŝŶŐ^ƚĂƚĞŝĚHome: Could an 
EffecƚŝǀĞ ŽŵĞƐƚŝĐ ^ƚĂƚĞ ŝĚ ZĞŐŝŵĞ Ğ ĞǀŝƐĞĚ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ h< ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞ Ăƚ
http://uksala.org/bringing-state-aid-home-could-an-effective-domestic-state-aid-regime-be-
devised-for-the-uk/. 
44
 For an overview, see Rubini (n 19).  
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E. CONCLUSION 
The shape of the UK state aid regime post-Brexit will undoubtedly be determined by the 
nature of the legal relationship between the UK and the EU. The EU has set out quite clearly 
that aŶǇĚĞĂůǁŝƚŚƚŚĞh<ƐŚŽƵůĚĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĂ ‘ůĞǀĞůƉůĂǇŝŶŐĨŝĞůĚ ?ŝŶƚŚĞĂƌĞĂŽĨƐƚĂƚĞĂŝĚĂŶĚ
competition law.
45
 This concern is likely to result in the EU insisting that state aid provisions 
are inserted into any agreement with the UK.
46
 The potential for no deal, however, remains 
very real. In the absence of a deal, the UK would remain bound by the provisions of the 
WTO SCM Agreement. While WTO law is certainly less interventionist than the EU state aid 
regime, the UK will not have free rein to subsidise domestic industry in the event of a hard 
Brexit. Furthermore, pragmatic self-interest is likely to result in the UK implementing a 
rigorous system of independent review of grant of state aid, even in the event of a no deal 
scenario.  
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 European Council guidelines (n 14).  
46
 Biondi (n 2) 450.  
